therefore, to recognize at the outset that medicine is thoroughly permeated with a plethora of philosophical questions which can, and do, masquerade as being simply empirical. Thus it is that such diverse concepts as existence, the beginning and end of life, health and disease, cure and prognosis, etc., are all in urgent need of re-examination and, ideally, should come under the purview of philosophy. The philosophy of medicine, in other words, is essentially an ontological overview of medical practice -a search into the very meaning of medicine. It is no longer sufficient to define medicine in such teleological terms as a human activity concerned with the reconstitution and maintenance of health; it is, quite clearly, very much more: medicine is essentially a moral enterprise comprising, among many other facets, a common moral obligation to all professional healers.
Having spoken of the crisis in medicine and the need for a philosophical enquiry, it is perhaps pertinent (as well as paradoxical) to note that some of the problems in modern medicine actually stem from a philosophical theory about the nature of persons, i.e. a conceptual analysis or metaphysical account of what human beings really are. It is in the nature of an effort to correct this that this paper is devoted.
One of the central concepts which has contributed largely to the existence of problems in contemporary medicine has been the continued acceptance of the Cartesian notion of mankind as a composite dualism: the separation of mind and body. It is proposed to demonstrate how this mechanistic view of mankind has influenced medical practice and how, by adopting a more contemporary philosophical approach, medical professionals can obtain a better understanding of what is, after all, their subject matter.
For the past three hundred years the Cartesian paradigm of embodiment has dominated both scientific and philosophical views of the body. As a result, the human body has been conceived as being a purely passive machine driven by mechanical causality. Thus it is seen as an inanimate entity in itself, having no intentionality nor teleology (these latter properties Descartes attributed to God); in effect, the body is seen: 'tout simple' as a mere 'res extensa'. The mind, on the other hand, has been understood as an incorporeal repository of intelligence, consciousness and motivation within the confines of the body, i.e. the 'res cogitans' (Descartes 1970 (Descartes , 1971 . (In this vision of the mind, Descartes' conception was not unlike the Augustinian soul: a separate, non-spatial substance that somehow pervades and energizes the body).
Descartes, at the time, expressed the wish' that this concept would assist the advance of medicine by removing some of the ethico-religious taboos then prevailing (Curley 1978 , Cottingham 1976 ). Grayeff (1977) recounts how Descartes also discussed, in later works, the relevance of mind-body interactionism.
During this century, and arising largely out of an amalgam of existentialism (Sartre 1957 , Camus 1958 and German philosophical anthropology (Jaspers 1931), a new concept of the 'body' has emerged. It is now clearer to recognize the difference between the cognitive, rationally-detached and objectifying approach to human existence and the participating, existential, subjective approach. Indeed, Tillich (1951) has maintained that both approaches are essential to the understanding of mankind.
In phenomenological terms, the body is not just a caused mechanism, but essentially an 'intentional' entity always goal-directed. Moreover, sensory perception is neither a mechanical process nor a thought process (the only Cartesian alternatives), but rather a bodily intelligence and affectivity. Especially helpful in envisaging this, is Merleau-Ponty's (1945, 1961) notion of embodiment as 'the lived-body'. The 'lived-body' is that experience of our body which cannot be objectified. Gabriel Marcel (1951) articulated this concept very succinctly when he wrote: 'I am my body in so far as I succeed in recognizing that this body of mine, cannot in the last analysis, be brought down to the level of being an object'. Thus, while our body can be seen as the mere 'object-body' of Descartes, it will always be derivative arising secondarily out of the experience of Merleau-Ponty's 'lived-body'. Human bodies, therefore, far from being Cartesian reductionist organ systems, can be better and more realistically envisaged as multiphasic, experiential beings of finite freedom. This model of embodiment has enormous significance when applied to medical practice and to some of its current problems, some of which will be gently touched upon in the light of this.
When a patient presents with an illness, it is essentially the loss of certain specific freedoms. The patient perceives himself as having an altered state of existence: 'the state of being ill', according to Pellegrino & Thomasma (1981) , 'is one of wounded humanity'. 'The person who becomes a patient suffers what is essentially an ontological assault'. The very nature of this is undeniably grounded in the patient's very own existential mechanisms. However, in the clinical encounter, while the physician customarily examines the Cartesian 'object-body' to seek the physical locus of pathology and identify its precipitant cause, the patient, on the other hand, presents with a 'lived-body': i.e. a highly experiential sense of different relationships mostly concerned with Buber's (1972) 'I -World'. Medical philosophers such as Straus (1963) have noted that the process of bodily objectification is actually furthered when the patient seeks clinical help: that is, illness tends to make a patient regard his body in an objectified way. Indeed to cooperate fully with the examining and often impersonal physician, the patient must purposefully take up this particular manner of self regard. It is essentially this phenomenon that Sartre (1957) referred to as the 'Other' (the physician) whose gaze had the effect of turning the patient's conscious 'for itself (the experiencing body) into the thingliness of the 'in-itself (the objective body), resulting inevitably in an irreducible tension. There is a constant contrast between the explicit inferences of the doctor and the existential experiences imbued with intentionality on the part of the patient.
Thus, if the patient is viewed simply as an 'object-body' (the Cartesian paradigm), a view which has clearly been the most prevalent until now, the physician is encouraged to treat it as such. The thoroughly suspect idea of the defective mechanism being taken to the doctor/mechanic for repair with its implicit focusing on the 'object-body' only has been well evaluated, documented and condemned by Heidegger (1962) .
It should now be clear that the predominantly phenomenological view of the 'lived-body' is that it is not a passive, impersonal object either fit to be neglected or to be simply handed over to a health professional in times of functional impairment. It is, most essentially, the centre of one's experiences, moods, expressions and thoughts: the very nexus of intentionality. This intentionality represents a heightened awareness of the body in health. Thus prevention of ill health through increased personal (and even social) responsibility, together with an encouragement for self-help maintenance, can only be truly effective by recognizing the 'lived-body' model. This 'lived-body' concept goes far to explain how the emotional state of a patient, the quality of the therapeutic alliance of doctor and patient and the patient's own attitude towards illness are integral both in diagnosis and prognosis. This contrasts, yet again, vividly with the Cartesian tendency to isolate the body from the essential self and what Husserl (1954) referred to as its 'Lebenswelt' or lifeworld: the realm of human personal and practical experiences. Cartesian medicine quite clearly does have a reductionist and thereby dehumanizing effect: the patient often appears as a physiological mechanism. Conversely, the phenomenological concept of the 'lived-body' essentially reunifies the body with the mind and, in so doing, emphasizes how subjective factors, such as self-image, attitude and emotional states can affect health.
The conceptual model of the 'lived-body' accommodates different levels of intentionality from almost purely organic processes to conscious behaviours. Even in conscious behaviours, there is a graduation from simple awareness to purposiveness. Thus, Leder (1984) can state that 'the paradigm of the lived-body, wherein subjectivity is always corporeally expressed, is better able to address the role of psychological factors in the aetiology of physical disease'. When disease is understood as arising out of body intentionality, it can no longer be held to be a merely mechanical affair.
Traditionally, the options of medical treatment reflect the Cartesian dualism from which they derive. Consequently, there is physical medicine involving surgical or pharmacological intervention and psychiatric medicine with its implicit use of the medical model, labelling and social control. In the latter, it should not be forgotten 'that positions as far apart as psychoanalytic theory (as first conceptualized by Freud) and the behaviour views of B. F. Skinner both restdespite their differenceon the hypnothesis that all human behaviour is causally determined' (Macklin 1982) . However, if the concept of the 'lived-body' is accepted, then a logical contingency ensues: many diseases arise from intermediate (i.e. not entirely mental nor entirely physical) bodily intentionality. Thus, the customary treatment options as mentioned above no longer best serve or are even relevant. This is because the therapies do not address the intentionality behind the disease. This phenomenon, incidentally, could well explain the emergence of some of the 'new therapies' (the so-called 'alternative medicine') which appear to foster health not via mechanical intervention nor through psychotherapy but by simply directly 'realigning' the intentions and processes of the lived-body.
Health care, then, in these terms requires understanding the paradigmatic role of the 'livedbody' -the unification of a functioning body incorporating within itself and manifesting itself as a conscious intentionality of self development.
The influence of this upon the problems currently besetting medical ethics cannot be understated; the Kantian precept that dictates respect for the dignity of human beings, the moral imperatives to promote the independence and self-legislating autonomy of all persons (including the incapacitated and socially undesirable) can now be re-expressed in terms of understanding and recognizing the patient's integral freedoms of intentionality. This intentionality can now be viewed as incorporating rationality, freedom and information.
In this very brief philosophical overview, hopefully an acceptance of what is, comparatively speaking, a contemporary concept of embodiment will stimulate the revision of some of the normative concepts currently pervading medical practice. In almost every medical endeavour, it is qualitatively and teleologically better to perceive and to understand human nature in a manner different from that in which one perceives and understands the natural world. Wittgenstein (1953) has said: 'We explain human behaviour by giving reasons not causes'.
